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“Latin-African” Solidarity –
The Cuban Civilian Mission 
in Angola, 1975-1991
From 1975 to 1991, almost 500,000
Cubans were actively involved in the
Angolan independence struggle and in
building up Angola as an independent
nation. Most of them were soldiers, but
they also included doctors, teachers,
building workers, and technicians. On
account both of its scope and duration and
of its wide-ranging operational areas, this
Cuban overseas mission marks a new
departure in African-Latin American his-
tory as well as underlining the historic
importance of transatlantic South-South
relations. Many of the Cubans who served
in Angola were descendants of African
slaves deported to Cuba between the 16th
and 19th centuries. It was to this historic
fact that Fidel Castro was alluding when,
at the Communist Party Conference at the
end of 1975, he defined Cuba as a “Latin-
African Nation”. For Castro, the logical
consequence was not simply a moral
obligation, but an obligation based on
blood relationship, to defend Cuba’s
“Angolan brothers and sisters” against the
“racist and imperialist forces of the South
African apartheid regime”: 
“In the fulfilment of our duties
which arise from our principles, our
ideology, our convictions, and our
very own blood, we have the obliga-
tion to defend Angola and Africa.” 
The mission in Angola was named
“Operación Carlota” after a female slave
by the name of Carlota, who had led a
slaves’ revolt in 1843 in the province of
Matanzas. This appeal by Castro to the
historic obligation of the Cuban nation ini-
tially appears to have fallen on fertile
ground – by the first half of 1976 there
were already more than 20,000 Cubans
doing active service in Angola.
Up until now, however, the main focus
of attention has been exclusively on the
military aspect of Cuban involvement,
since the independence struggle in Angola
developed into one of the major proxy wars
during the Cold War in Africa. Although
Cuban civilians constituted one tenth of
all those involved in the mission, only
marginal reference, if any, is ever made to
the work they did or to their direct assis-
tance in building up the new Angolan
state. And yet, especially in the medical
sector, a major factor behind the almost
legendary reputation Cuba enjoys among
the developing nations lies in the work of
the civilian internationalists, still present
today in a large number of African states.
There is a powerful symbolism inherent in
Cuban civilian auxiliary aid and, up to the
present day, it remains an important part
of Cuban foreign policy. 
Cuban aid to rebuild Angola and to
meet basic needs and Cuba’s Third
World politics
To an extent hitherto unknown among
countries in the Southern hemisphere,
Cuba won political influence, prestige and
popularity as a result of the assistance it
gave, especially in Africa – not least
because the operations met what were, lit-
erally, vitally important needs among the
young African nations: medical care, edu-
cation, civil engineering, agricultural tech-
nology, livestock breeding, and the culti-
vation of food crops. 
What is more, rather than introducing
complicated methods and processes to Ib
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Africa, the Cubans brought reliable, easy-
to-understand, robust technology, the use
of which was comprehensible even to the
uneducated populace. On the basis of their
own experience, the internationalists –
themselves inhabitants of a developing
nation – had a better intuitive understand-
ing of the population’s problems than did,
for example, development workers from
western nations or from the former East
Bloc states. 
As far as Cuban involvement in Ango-
la is concerned, there are a number of indi-
cators suggesting that this comprehensive
commitment also had a stabilising func-
tion. This view was corroborated by the
Belgian Foreign Minister at the time,
Henri Simonet, after having paid a state
visit to Angola in October 1978 – an opin-
ion also shared, in fact, by several US aca-
demic researchers. Cuba’s support for one
of the three competing Angolan liberation
movements, the Marxist-Leninist oriented
Movimento Popular de Libertação de
Angola (MPLA), is largely to be traced
back to a trip made to Africa by the former
Cuban industry minister Ernesto “Che”
Guevara in the year 1965. First instances
of support given to African anti-colonial
movements such as the Algerian Front de
Libération Nationale (FLN) and to the
independent nation of Algeria already
occurred shortly after the revolution. 
At the first conference of non-aligned
states in 1961, Cuba had signalised its
affinity to all countries of the “Third
World”, and emphasised that progress
could only be achieved for underdevel-
oped countries by means of an all-out
attack on imperialist interests. Cuba’s
political motives for its involvement in
Africa were the struggle against colonial
powers and imperialist interests with the
goal of building up a world-wide anti-
imperialist front – the notion of interna-
tional solidarity among the countries of
the southern hemisphere in their struggle
against the colonialism and imperialism of
the North. The Cuban revolution was to
become “internationalised”. International
solidarity and proletarian internationalism
were, in future, to be the cornerstones of
Cuban foreign policy. 
In the course of the 1960s and 1970s,
Cuban troops, staff, and civilian auxiliary
personnel were not only present in Algeria
and Angola, but also in Ethiopia, Senegal,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzav-
ille, Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea-Bissau. This solidarity discourse
of “Internationalism” was decisively
shaped by Guevara and his supporters dur-
ing their Africa trip, and it served as a jus-
tification for dispatching Cuban civilian
auxiliary helpers, instructors, and troops.
The later success of Cuban troops in
Angola, who not only repeatedly warded
off the intervention of the South African
army in 1975 and the ensuing years, but
also helped the MPLA to victory against
the rival UNITA and secured them long
years in power, was an important mile-
stone for Cuba’s role as the dominant
power among the countries of the so-
called Third World.
Cuba’s commitment to MPLA versus
South African support for UNITA
In the West, Cuba’s commitment to the
cause of the MPLA was viewed with
severe mistrust and evaluated in terms of
the dichotomies familiar from the Cold
War period. The central issue was the role
of Cuba as a supposed “accomplice” in
Soviet foreign policy in Africa, even
although it was already apparent in the
1980s that Cuba was pursuing a foreign
policy which was quite independent of the
USSR, and that its Africa missions were
by no means always compatible with
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Soviet global interests. This was also the
case in Angola.
In the spring of 1975, the leader of the
MPLA, Agostinho Neto, asked the Cuban
government for financial and military sup-
port. It had become apparent that, on
account of rivalry in the form of the UNITA
(União para a Independência Total de
Angola) and the FNLA (Frente Nacional
para a Libertação de Angola), the MPLA
would require to use military force in its
battle for supremacy on Angola’s indepen-
dence day (11th November 1975). 
Cuba was initially hesitant in respond-
ing to this request, and it was not until the
end of July that the first Cuban staff
arrived in Angola. Shortly before the
agreed date for Angola’s independence,
when the South African army invaded
Angola supported by the FNLA in order to
prevent the assumption of power by a
Marxist government, Cuba finally reacted
by dispatching huge numbers of its special
ministry of the interior troops. The Soviet
Union supplied the necessary war materi-
al. With the help of the Cuban troops, who
overpowered the South African interven-
tion force and the FNLA close to the capi-
tal city Luanda, the MPLA was able to
lead Angola to independence alone. Due
to the presence of the Cubans, it also
proved possible to successfully ward off a
second offensive against the MPLA gov-
ernment in March 1976. 
It was during this phase that the first
contingent of Cuban doctors arrived in
Angola. Initially they provided medical
care primarily for the Cuban and Angolan
armed forces, but in view of the health
care crisis in the country – a majority of
the non-urban Angolan population had
never seen a doctor in their lives – the doc-
tors very soon made a priority of treating
the civilian population. After the end of
the so-called “second war of liberation” in
March 1976, even although the indepen-
dence of Angola under the political
supremacy of the MPLA had initially been
secured, there still remained a lack of
qualified manpower and know-how in
what was, in terms of mineral resources
and raw material reserves, a rich country.
As a result of the hasty departure of a
majority of the Portuguese population,
Angola’s industrial and agricultural pro-
duction had gone into complete stagna-
tion. More than 90% of the Angolan popu-
lation were illiterate, and the majority of
the people in Angola had no notion at all
of what was involved in building up an
independent nation. 
In view of these facts, from May 1976
onwards the Cuban soldiers were urged to
stay on in Angola, to lay aside their arms,
and to contribute to the rebuilding of the
country in their civilian professions. This
was the starting point for systematic civil-
ian action by Cubans in Angola. When
Agostinho Neto, by then President of the
independent People’s Republic of Angola,
paid an official state visit to Cuba at the
end of July, he publicly praised Cuban
involvement in his country. On his tour of
the island with his state guest, Castro
enlisted the support of further volunteers
for this civilian support, and the two coun-
tries agreed on wider economical and
technical co-operation. 
From then on, the Cuban population
was prepared for massive involvement at
all levels in Angola. Castro provided a fur-
ther political argument for action in Ango-
la by comparing the victory over the troops
of the South African apartheid regime with
the crushing defeat of the US intervention
at Playa Girón (the Bay of Pigs) in April
1961 – from that point onwards, Angola
was to symbolise the “African Girón”.
This civilian mission became institu-
tionalised on the part of Cuba in December
1976 with the creation of the Consejo
Estatal de Colaboración Económica
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(CECE), which from then on was to co-
ordinate all technical internationalist mis-
sions abroad, as well as all overseas eco-
nomic exchange programmes. The decision
to dispatch civilian auxiliary personnel,
however, remained the prerogative of those
within the Cuban government responsible
for the Angolan intervention. And the
humanitarian objectives of the civilian mis-
sion in Angola should not be allowed to
blur the fact that all operations took place in
close co-ordination with the military lead-
ership of the troops stationed in Angola. 
The protracted nature of the civilian
and, in particular, the military mission in
Angola is primarily a consequence of the
fact that, under the pretext of combating
the Namibian liberation front SWAPO
(South West Africa’s People’s Organisa-
tion), the South African army also under-
took repeated incursions into Angolan ter-
ritory. In the course of their actions, the
South Africans supplied financial and mil-
itary support to the UNITA under the lead-
ership of Neto’s most bitter rival, Jonas
Savimbi. Thanks to this support – and to
military support from the USA – the
UNITA was able to consolidate its sphere
of influence, especially in the rural areas
of the south and the east. A further avowed
goal of the UNITA was to drive the Cuban
troops, armed and financially supported
by the Soviet Union, out of Angola once
and for all. In the understanding of the
UNITA, the presence of Cuban troops in
Angola constituted a foreign army of
occupation. Accordingly, in the mid
1980s, Cuban civilians working in urban
settlements also increasingly became tar-
gets for UNITA attacks. Thus, for exam-
ple, 14 Cubans were killed in a bomb
attack on a Cuban building workers’ resi-
dence in the town of Huambo in April
1984. On the other hand, however, a mili-
tary attack by the UNITA on the coastal
town of Sumbe in March of the same year
also clearly demonstrated the flexible
function of the Cuban civilian mission.
The civilians successfully helped to
defend Sumbe, since all Cubans embark-
ing on active service in Angola were first
required to complete a course of basic mil-
itary training.
Cooperation in the educational sector
In 1977, the Angolan government
embarked on a literacy campaign – a task
with which the Cubans who, in 1961, had
successfully taught one million of their
population to read and write, were famil-
iar enough. The language barrier between
Spanish and the official Angolan national
language Portuguese (which was spoken
at least in the urban regions) was minimal,
and the Cuban government decided to
send contingents of several hundred stu-
dent teachers to Angola as literacy work-
ers, initially for a year each. Thus, in addi-
tion to Cuban medical aid, a second major
cornerstone of civilian co-operation was
created between Cuba and Angola. 
However, there was a further dimen-
sion to the Cuban support in this area,
inasmuch as Cuba also dispatched advi-
sors to the Angolan ministry of education
where teaching curricula, lesson contents
and pedagogical concepts were drawn up
based on Cuban models. The students of
teaching were soon supplemented by
Cuban teachers and university professors
who, as a rule, absolved a one-to-two-year
period of service, attempting to free the
precarious Angolan educational system
from its colonial past and to apply new
teaching methods tried and tested in Cuba.
The Angolan university system was large-
ly rebuilt by Cuban university teaching
staff in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly
in the natural science and agricultural
technology sectors. 
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A further important feature of the co-
operation in the educational sector, initiat-
ed in 1976, was the education given to
Angolan children and young adults in
Cuban schools and universities. This
scholarship programme, which was later
to include the training and further educa-
tion of adults as skilled labourers, techni-
cians, engineers and doctors, was soon
expanded upon, and a boarding school-
cum-field centre created on the Isla de la
Juventud where children and young adults
from Africa, Asia and Latin America
received training. Time and again, Cuba’s
political opponents pointed to this training
of Angolan children in Cuba as evidence
for the indoctrination of young Angolans
in the ideology of the Cuban revolution.
In contrast to the Cuban soldiers, who
were frequently stationed in sparsely pop-
ulated areas, those Cubans doing civilian
service, especially doctors and teachers,
were in day-to-day contact with the
Angolan population and thus had the
opportunity to gain insights into Angolan
culture and society. 
However, whether or not this experi-
ence in fact led to the Cubans concerned
sensing their historic and cultural bonds
with the continent of Africa and its people,
as propagated by the Cuban government,
is questionable. There are a number of
indicators suggesting that, for the majority
of Cubans, the continent of Africa was the
great unknown. Africa appears far more to
have served as a projection surface for
notions of “savagery”, “poverty”, and
“backwardness” – an attitude which was
fully on a par with European or western
stereotypes concerning Africa. Even for
Cubans of African descent, Castro’s talk
of a “Latin-African nation” and of “blood
relationship bonds” binding Angola and
Cuba tended to have a rather abstract sig-
nificance. Only very few of them felt
themselves familiar with Angola after
serving there. The majority were glad to
leave behind an often chaotic and danger-
ous warfare zone and to be able to return
once more to the stable living conditions
of their insular realm. Angola had become
the negative counterpart of their own soci-
ety. In view of their often traumatic expe-
riences in Angola, they inevitably came to
regard their own sphere of life and experi-
ence as a superior civilisation. 
The experience of Cubans in Angola
It is important to bear in mind, when
dealing with the experience of Cubans in
Angola, that, even for the civilians, this
was dominated by an increasingly brutal
and unpredictable war, the omnipresence
of which was to be felt, albeit indirectly,
even in the urban areas. A good number of
Cubans paid for their civilian service with
their lives. Those Cubans who served not
in Angola, but in other African countries
not in a state of warfare, often express far
more positive recollections of Africa.
Apart from that, however, all of them were
shocked at the extreme social inequality
and the precarious living conditions they
encountered among the majority of the
population – slums, a lack of hygiene and
medical care, life-threatening diseases,
high infant mortality, food shortages, illit-
eracy, and widespread ignorance. Almost
none of them had been prepared for such a
situation. 
It was not until later, when Cubans
who had returned from Angola began to
tell of their experience there, that any
knowledge of the difficult living condi-
tions in Angola began to spread among the
Cuban population. Those who set out for
Angola in the 1980s knew that an extreme
and frequently mortally dangerous experi-
ence awaited them. The fact that there was
one member in almost every Cuban fami-
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ly with Angola experience meant that
“Angola” came to be a collective experi-
ence within Cuban society. In the memo-
ries of many Cubans – given the years of
economic crisis which hit their island
starting in the early 1990s after the Angola
mission was ended – Angola remains a
difficult phase in their history. 
Nevertheless, on account of their
socialisation in revolutionary Cuba, most
Cubans were fundamentally persuaded not
only of the success of the internationalist
concept, but also that what they them-
selves were doing was right. Yet despite
that fact, each and every one of those who
volunteered to serve in Angola also had
their own individual motives. For the vast
majority, the time spent in Angola was
their first opportunity to leave the island
of Cuba and to travel abroad. Curiosity
and a powerful desire to get to know the
world beyond their Caribbean island was
but one of the major reasons. A further
important factor was the fact that interna-
tionalist service overseas was (and still is)
held in high regard within Cuban society,
being rewarded with social prestige – and
possibly even with improved career
opportunities – on returning home to
Cuba. The Cuban internationalists – no
matter whether they were civilian or mili-
tary personnel – had their place of work
and continued payment of wages guaran-
teed, as well as receiving a small addition-
al pay in Angola. A fair number enter-
tained the hope that a stay abroad would
also improve their material situation, for
example by enabling them to purchase
western consumer goods. 
The question regarding the financing
of the entire Angola mission remains unan-
swered to the present day. While the Cuban
government still insists on the internation-
alist principle that it acted out of pure altru-
ism, it has been repeatedly assumed that
the Angolan side provided services in
return for the mission – something which
would have been perfectly justifiable,
given the great magnitude of the operation. 
A further question yet to be explored
is how the Angolan population reacted to
the civilian support by the Cubans, and
what form the concrete co-operation
between Angolans and Cubans took. The
Cuban presence in Angola was ended by
the terms of the peace treaty signed in
New York in December 1988 by South
Africa, the MPLA government, and Cuba,
and in which the independence of Namib-
ia was agreed conditional to the withdraw-
al of Cuban troops from Angola. The last
Cubans returned home from Angola in
mid-June 1991. Civilian auxiliary person-
nel from Cuba, now mostly recruited via
international humanitarian organisations,
were not deployed again in Angola until
the end of the 1990s.
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Gilberto Calcagnotto
Brasil 2005: Crise política
versus reforma política?
Neste pequeno artigo procura-se mos-
trar que, se por um lado a crise apresenta
instituições investigativas em pleno fun-
cionamento democrático, por outro a
busca de uma reforma política feita às
pressas – além de não encontrar respaldo
na real vontade política dos parlamentares
– não tem o apoio de cientistas políticos
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